School choice in the light of the effectiveness differences of various types of public and private school in 19 OECD countries by Dronkers, J. & Robert, Peter
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
School choice in the light of the
effectiveness differences of various types
of public and private school in 19 OECD
countries
J. Dronkers and Peter Robert
Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and
Organization (METEOR), ELTE University
2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21888/
MPRA Paper No. 21888, posted 13. April 2010 02:10 UTC
SCHOOL CHOICE IN THE LIGHT OF THE EFFECTIVENES DIFFERENCES 
OF VARIOUS TYPES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN 19 OECD 
COUNTRIES
J. Dronkers1 & P. Robert2
Last revised: July 8, 2008
Word count (including tables, etc): 15.509
Abstract
The paper approaches the issue of school choice in an indirect manner by investigating 
the effectiveness of public, private government-dependent and private independent 
schools in 19 OECD countries selected from the PISA 2000 survey for this purpose. In a 
multi-level approach we estimate these sector-effects, controlling for sociological 
characteristics of students and parents, school composition, teaching and learning 
conditions of schools and students’ and principals’ perception of the climate of their 
schools. The main explanation of the gross differences in mathematical achievement is 
the better social composition of private schools, both government-dependent and 
independent, which is a clear consequence of school choice. But our analysis also reveals 
that private independent schools are less effective than public schools with the same 
students, parents and social composition, while that private dependent schools are more 
effective than comparable public schools. The explanation of these remaining net 
differences in mathematical achievement seems to be the better school climate of private 
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dependent schools. The comparison concludes that these net differences in mathematical 
achievement between public and private school-sectors are equal across nations, despite 
the historical and legal variations in their educational systems and school choice 
approaches. 
Keywords
school choice, school effectiveness, public versus private schools, cross-national 
comparison, secondary education
Introduction
The effectiveness of public and private schools has been the topic of a large number of 
studies in the educational sciences, sociology and economics, not only in the USA but 
also in Europe. In this literature, the distinction between public owned and funded 
schools, private but public funded schools (often religious schools) and private owned 
and funded schools, is especially important. Firstly, because in many countries these 
three types of schools exist alongside each other, especially in Europe where this was the 
unintended outcome of the 19th century struggle between the State and the Church(es). 
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Secondly, the functions of these three types of schools differ strongly, whether this be 
along social, cultural, religious or ethnic lines. Thirdly, the distinction between owned 
and public funded schools, and private but public funded schools, also relates to current 
policy debates about organizing and financing collective goods like education. 
Although there are many exceptions, the general trend of this research on the 
effectiveness of private and public schools can be summarized as follows: private but 
public funded schools (often religious schools) are more effective in cognitive outcomes 
than public owned and public funded schools, even after controlling for social and 
cultural composition of these schools; private owned and private funded schools are less 
effective in cognitive outcomes than public owned and public funded schools, but only 
after controlling for the social and cultural composition of these schools. 
Although the effectiveness of public and private schools is relevant for nearly all 
OECD countries, no comparative research has been conducted on the differences in the 
effectiveness of different types of schools. This lack of comparative research is partly due 
to the dominance of American research on this topic, and partly due to the strong nation-
state orientation of the social sciences. Yet another contributing factor may be the 
political sensitivity of the possible lower effectiveness of public schools, especially in 
Europe. The only overview available is that provided by Dronkers (2004), who reviews 
the differences in effectiveness between religious state-funded schools and public schools 
in a number of single-country studies, including Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, 
the Netherlands and Scotland.
There is, however, a need for comparative research because, in order to explain 
the cause of this difference in effectiveness between public and private schools, one must 
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have sufficient variation of various school characteristics. As this variation is often 
lacking within a single state, for example due to nation-wide regulations which restrict 
the range of variation between schools, single-country studies may fail to capture the 
‘real’ effect of private and public schools. In an earlier article (Dronkers & Robert, 2008) 
we used the reading scores of individual students to analyze cross-nationally the 
effectiveness differences of private and public schools in 22 countries. We used in that 
article the same PISA 2000 data, as we will do in this paper, but have a different 
dependent variable. Their main finding is that the gross differences in reading 
achievement is the better social composition of private schools, both government-
dependent and independent, which is a clear consequence of school choice. But their 
analysis also reveals that private independent schools are less effective in achieving high 
reading scores than public schools with the same students, parents and social 
composition, while that private dependent schools are more effective than comparable 
public schools. The explanation of these remaining net differences in reading 
achievement seems to be the better school climate of the private dependent schools. The 
comparison concludes that these net differences in reading achievement between public 
and private school-sectors are equal across nations. Corten & Dronkers (2006) addressed 
with the same PISA 2000 data but for 19 countries whether the slopes of the social 
background of the students vary between public, private goverment dependent and 
private independent schools. They found only a few differences in these slopes in relation 
to the social background of students. The few differences suggested that private schools 
did better for students from lower classes. 
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However, here we use the math score of the individual students in 19 PISA 2000 
counties as dependent variable. A separate analysis of this math score in relate to private 
and public schools is necessary, while mathematical performance is more dependent of 
the school effectiveness and less of the parental capital. By using mathematical 
performance as dependent variable we have a lower risk to mix up school effects with 
unmeasured parental characteristics. Regarding our aims in this new analysis, first, we 
will attempt a systematic empirical test of the degree of effectiveness differences in 
mathematical performance of individual students in public and private secondary schools 
in 19 OECD countries, controlling for the characteristics of students and parents. Second, 
we will try to explain these differences in effectiveness according to the differing 
characteristics of schools. Third, we will test whether or not these differences in 
effectiveness are equal in the 19 OECD countries. Finally we discuss our results in the 
light of the choices between the school sectors we distinguished in our research. 
Public schools, private independent schools and private government-dependent 
schools 
As a consequence of the struggle between the church and the state within many European 
societies, modern private schools can have different relations with the state. The most 
fundamental aspect of this relationship is the degree to which private schools are funded 
by the (local, regional, national) government, alongside student fees, donations, 
sponsorships, and parental fundraising. In a number of societies, private schools have a 
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juridical right to funding by the state, provided they meet certain conditions. In some 
cases this right is enshrined in constitutional law (Germany, Netherlands), while in others 
this right is accorded by normal law (France, Hungary). This right of funding of private 
schools by the state also means a restriction of the autonomy of the funded private 
schools. Although these restrictions differ from society to society, and vary with the 
degree of state funding, one can say that, in general, this decreases the autonomy of these 
schools regarding their curriculum, mode of examination, payment of teachers and 
admission criteria of students. These private government-dependent schools can now be 
found in sufficient numbers in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the USA (See Table 1).
Alongside these private government-dependent schools, there exist in a number of 
OECD countries private schools which do not get funding from the (local, regional, 
national) government. Financially, they are fully dependent on student fees, donations, 
sponsorships, and parental fundraising. However, their school autonomy can still be 
restricted in two ways. First, authorities might set criteria even for independent private 
schools in order to ensure some minimum quality of the socialization of the next 
generation. Second, even independent private schools function within a societal context 
and are partly determined by it. For example, entrance criteria for universities will restrict 
the autonomy of a private school’s curriculum. However, private school autonomy will 
be largest in their student admission policies, especially given the importance of student 
fees for the financing of these schools. These private independent schools can now be 
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found in sufficient numbers in Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, New 
Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA (See Table 1).
Given the different conditions for private independent and private government-
dependent schools and their opportunities for competition with public schools, we will 
consequently distinguish between independent private schools, private government-
dependent schools, and public schools. By doing so, we can test whether these two types 
of private schools are simply interchangeable forms of private schools, as argued by 
Vandenberghe & Robin (2004) in their analyses of the same PISA data. Furthermore we 
can also analyze whether these two types of private schools appear as different options 
from the viewpoint of school choice.
We acknowledge that this distinction between public, private government 
dependent and private independent schools is still crude. Especially the history and the 
evolution of these various types can be quite different in the various societies: church 
versus market oriented; one church versus various churches oriented; strong versus weak 
connection with various political parties; strongly contested versus broadly accepted; 
recent growth versus a long-standing existence. Also their actual constitutional 
arrangements will be quite different: based upon constitutional right versus policy 
agreement; a strong versus weak control by state authorities. Therefore, it is important to 
control for the effectiveness of the various conditions of teaching and learning, like 
teaching and material resources and degree of school autonomy, as we will do. For that 
reason we will also test whether these differences in effectiveness are equal in the various 
countries. It might be possible that public, private government dependent and private 
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independent schools have the same function in modern society, despite the different 
history and constitutional arrangements.
Public and private schools have to operate in these nations under different 
conditions, both financial and educational. Also the school choice processes and their 
degree of freedom will be different in these countries (both legally and in practice). In the 
vast majority of these countries private dependent schools can be characterized as 
chartered, non-district schools or ‘pure’ universal tuition voucher, non-district schools 
(Merrifield, 2007). The other types of school choice (tuition tax credits; targeted 
vouchers) do not exist in these countries or are irrelevant for the private – public 
distinction, because all schools get them (for instance extra money for private dependent 
and private schools with high percentages of immigrant pupils in the Netherlands and 
France). Also in the vast majority of these countries public school get the same or even 
more financial support by the state, but they are more often district bound in their 
recruitment of pupils (this is more true for the French but less for the Dutch public 
schools, and that can even vary between municipalities in these countries).
Possible explanations of effectiveness differences between public and private schools
The literature on the possible causes of effectiveness differences between schools is 
extensive. Since we cannot review it here in its complexity, we draw on the most recent 
overviews (Sammons, Hillman & Mortimore, 1995; Scheerens & Bosker 1997; Teddlie 
& Reynolds 2000). Thus, for example, Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) analysed the 
effectiveness differences between public and catholic schools in the USA, with Coleman 
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and Hoffer (1987) and Bryk, Lee and Holland (1993) providing comprehensive follow-up 
studies of these same differences. Dronkers (2004), meanwhile, reviewed the empirical 
evidence of effectiveness differences between public, catholic and protestant schools in 
Europe. Below, we will summarise only the most debated causes of these differences, as 
a subsequent basis for selecting the relevant variables on students, parents and schools for 
analysing and interpret them.
Differences in student characteristics and in school composition
Given the higher probability that private schools will ask fees from parents, the social 
background of students in private and public schools will vary, especially in terms of the 
occupational, educational and financial characteristics of both parents. Consequently, 
more students from a more favourable background will go to private schools, which in 
turn might improve the social composition of the school population. More students of a 
favourable background will increase the opportunities of reaching higher levels of 
scholastic achievement, both as a result of a higher level at the start of secondary school, 
the better teaching and learning conditions (especially more teaching, due to a lower level 
of non-academic disturbances), and more possibilities to match pupils with a specific 
curriculum, pedagogy and teachers. This will promote a potentially better reputation of 
academic quality for private schools in comparison to public schools, thus attracting 
different students. We will try to control for as many social background characteristics as 
possible, as well as the social composition of the student body of schools. 
Deliberate school choice
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Closely related to the reputation of academic quality of private schools is the argument of 
a deliberate educational choice. A deliberate choice for an 'unconventional' school (as 
compared to a 'traditional' choice for a common school) will increase the possibility of 
this 'unconventional' school becoming a community in which students perform better. 
Depending on a deliberate educational choice, and the self-selection following on from 
such a choice, both private and public schools can become a community of shared values 
and dense social ties which can affect student achievement. Given the fact that in most of 
the 19 OECD countries we will analyse (except for Belgium, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands) public schools are the most common, private schools will be the 
deliberately chosen ones. Parents, students and teachers of deliberately chosen schools 
will expect more efforts from each other, will tend to form a community of shared values 
and dense social ties, and will generally be more ready to help the school.  We will try to 
control for the causes of these effects of deliberate choice of school by controlling for the 
academic and cultural interests, resources, attitudes and behaviours of parents and 
students. 
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Different conditions for teaching, learning and school administration 
Public and private schools differ in their administrations and conditions for teaching and 
learning. While public schools are fully dependent on the state for their finances and their 
administration, private schools depend more on student fees and private charity, and only 
occasionally on the state for additional support. It is not self evident that private schools 
have the optimal conditions compared to public school (for instance the student/teacher 
ratio), but differences in these conditions might influence effectiveness. There is also a 
variation in educational administration between public and private schools (Hofman, 
1993) and this can also help explain some of the differences in educational performance. 
These differences refer less to the formal differences in educational administration but 
more to the tendency for stronger informal relations between governing school-board and 
teachers in private schools, which may partly explain the better performance of their 
pupils. We will try to control for these differences in administration, learning and 
teaching conditions by controlling for various aspects of the school characteristics. 
Different school climates
Given the possible differences in students, parents, social composition of the school 
population, school administration and conditions for teaching and learning between 
public and private schools, different patterns of behaviour from teachers and students 
might develop. These different behavioural patterns will promote more or less shared 
beliefs about what students should learn, about the proper norms of instruction, and how 
student and teachers should relate to each other. These patterns, which form the basis of a 
school climate, might affect the effectiveness of teaching and learning within these 
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schools. These patterns may also affect teacher morale, which can also influence teaching 
effectiveness. We will try to control for these differences in school climate by controlling 
for various indicators of the behaviour of teachers and students. 
Stronger core curriculum
Public and private schools can differ in the strength of the core curriculum they offer to 
their students, regardless of their personal background or future educational plans. A 
strong core curriculum integrates the structure and policy of schools, not only for students 
but also for teachers. Private schools tend to have a more limited differentiation in their 
curriculum compared to public schools. This limitation in curricular differentiation can be 
partly the consequence of the smaller school size and the more limited resources of 
private schools, due to their (partial) dependence on non-governmental funds. However, 
the limitation in curricular differentiation can also be the consequence of long-standing 
traditions about what constitutes a proper education. Religious schools in particular 
(Jewish, Catholic or Protestant) can draw on such old traditions to shape their curriculum, 
thus avoiding strong curricular differentiation, even if the religious inspiration has been 
weakened. This limited differentiation in the curriculum of  private schools can be a 
strength, because it allows less a move to a less challenging stream or differentiation. 
Unfortunately, we cannot control directly for these differences in core curriculum 
(although we try indirectly by the amount of time dedicated to reading and mathematics), 
because the PISA data contains hardly any of the relevant indicators. Nevertheless, it is 
important to keep this factor in mind.
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Use of PISA data and measures
Data
Our analysis is based on the PISA 2000 survey organized by the OECD, under the project 
title The OECD Programme for International Student Assessment. This research aimed to 
provide internationally comparable evidence on the performance of 15-year-old students 
in all the OECD countries. The data-file used for the empirical analysis is exactly the 
same, which the OECD has made available on the Internet for the purpose of secondary 
analysis.1 The database comprises data collected in 2000 in 32 countries. In addition to 
the original variables derived from the survey, OECD researchers have developed 
numerous aggregated measures based on students’ and school principals’ responses, and 
these variables were also added to the dataset. Information on these aggregated measures 
is available from the Manual for the PISA 2000 Database as well as from the PISA 2000 
Technical Report, including their reliability and internal consistency. We decided to use 
these broadly accepted measures and arrange them into sociologically meaningful groups 
for estimating student achievement and the characteristics of their parents and schools, 
rather than developing our own (potentially more contestable) indicators.
The strength of the PISA 2000 data is its cross-national comparability. The 
OECD/CERI has developed scheme to compare the outcomes of various educational 
systems by making use of the experiences of earlier efforts to compare cross-nationally 
educational results (AERA; TIMMS). By using a multilateral approach to develop this 
scheme, it has avoided a one-sided measurement and its results are widely recognized 
throughout the OECD countries. Although one can doubt whether the PISA indicators 
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cover all particularities of the education systems of each analyzed country, they are the 
most reliable and valid data for a cross-national comparison across a large number of 
modern societies. A weakness of the PISA 2000 data is the cross-sectional nature of the 
collected data. It is a one-moment picture of the 15-year-old students: we do not know 
anything about their further development, neither about their earlier education 
experiences and outcomes. It is widely recognized that a longitudinal measurement of 
educational outcomes in relation to school characteristics is superior to a cross-sectional 
measurement, because longitudinal data allows better to control for unmeasured variables 
and (self-)selection. Unfortunately such a cross-national and longitudinal data set is not 
available and will probably not available in the coming years. Moreover we know from 
the history of the study of school effectiveness that the higher effectiveness of non-public 
schools is lower in longitudinal data, but that the direction of the results is equal to those 
obtained with cross-sectional data. (for instance the analogy between the outcomes of 
Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore (1982) using cross-sectional data and those of Coleman and 
Hoffer (1987), using longitudinal data) Therefore, we think that an analysis of these 
special cross-sectional data is worthwhile and scientifically interesting. 
Another weakness of the PISA data can be the measurement of the school 
characteristics. Most are based on the answers of the principals (like teacher and student 
misbehavior, teacher morale) and others are based on the pupils’ answers (achievement 
pressure, teacher-student relationship, sense of belonging to school). One would prefer to 
have comparable measurements of the school characteristics, given by both principals, 
teachers, pupils and parents. But they are not available in the PISA data  (only principals 
and pupils are questioned). However, we do not believe that pupils or principals answers 
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to questions on school characteristics are a priory less invalid as the answers of teachers 
or parents.
Private and public schools.
For the purpose of this paper, for studying effectiveness of public and private schools in a 
comparative perspective, we have selected a certain number of countries to be included in 
the analysis. The selection was based on choosing those countries where both the public 
and private sectors of education are developed, and which represent a wide range of 
different types of societies from different regions. We also distinguish between private 
independent schools and private government-dependent schools. This division was 
developed earlier by the OECD, was applied by the PISA survey and it shows up in many 
discussions about the various forms of private and public schools and school choice 
(Merrifield, 2007). The schools are classified as either public or private solely according 
to whether a public agency or a private entity has the ultimate power to make decisions 
concerning the institution's affairs. An institution is classified as public if it is (1) 
controlled and managed directly by a public education authority or agency or, (2) is 
controlled and managed either by a government agency directly or by a governing body 
(Council, Committee etc.), most of whose members are appointed by a public authority or 
elected by public franchise. In contrast, an institution is classified as private if it is 
controlled and managed by a non-governmental organization (for example a Church, 
Trade Union or business enterprise), or if its Governing Board consists mostly of 
members not selected by a public agency. The terms "government-dependent" and 
"independent" refer only to the degree of a private school's dependence on funding from 
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government sources; they do not refer to the degree of government direction or 
regulation. A government-dependent private school is one that receives more than 50 per 
cent of its core funding from government agencies. An independent private school is one 
that receives less than 50 per cent of its core funding from government agencies. "Core 
funding" refers to the funds that support the basic educational services of the schools. It 
does not include funds provided specifically for research projects, payments for services 
purchased or contracted by private organisations, or fees and subsidies received for 
ancillary services, such as lodging and meals. Government-dependent private schools can 
thus include chartered schools in the USA, state granted religious schools in many 
European societies, but also state granted schools with a particular didactic concept like 
Montessori. Government independent private schools can thus include religious schools 
in the USA, religious schools in some European societies, but also schools with a 
particular didactic or philosophical concept like Anthroposophy (like the Walddorf 
schools in Germany). The PISA data don’t allow us to make these distinctions within the 
private school sectors.2
The countries we have selected are, in alphabetical order, Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and the USA. These countries have enough absolute numbers of students with 
a valid math score (see section data preparation) attending a form of private school in the 
PISA data for reliable estimates of effectiveness to be made (See Table 1 for our final 
data set).
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Data preparation
We use the unweighted data, because we are interested in the ‘quasi-experimental’ effect 
that being a student in a private or public school has on educational results. From this 
perspective, each country is an ‘experimental’ case, which should not be reweighted 
because of its population size. Such a reweighting with real student population sizes for 
each country would produce an unbalanced result, in which countries with the highest 
student populations (and thus with certain types of public and private schools) would 
dominate the results, while countries with small student populations (and thus with 
certain types of public and private schools) would have a smaller effect on the outcomes. 
An analysis with reweighted data would, therefore, produce invalid estimates of the 
effectiveness of the various public and private schools. For this reason, the analysis sticks 
to the original number of cases, with some corrections for very small schools (see below). 
Fortunately, the sample-size in the various countries did not vary too much, allowing us 
to treat countries under more or less equal ‘experimental’ conditions, and without 
deleting cases.      
In addition to the selection of countries, we also follow a selection procedure with 
respect to schools and students, and include only those students for whom the basic 
information on gender, school grade, valid score of achievement (the dependent 
variables), on type of school as described above, location of school, and family type was 
available. In the case of the other independent variables, if missing cases occurred in the 
data, these were replaced by the mean value of the variable. We deleted also all schools 
with less than 11 pupils who also participated in the math test (see next section dependent 
variable), because too many schools with very low numbers of students could jeopardize 
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the reliable estimation of the effectiveness of these schools. This deletion may lead to a 
bias towards sectors with larger schools, but we prefer this bias to unstable or unreliable 
estimates of school effects. As a consequence of this deletion of small schools in some 
countries all private schools were dropped. For instance United Kingdom has also private 
dependent schools, but less that 11 pupils in each of these participating schools filled in 
the math test and thus these schools are dropped.
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Variables
Dependent variable.
The PISA 2000 survey contained focused primarily on students’ reading. Mathematics 
and science abilities were of secondary importance in PISA 2000.3 For this analysis, we 
use only one of the three possible dependent variables on students’ performance: we will 
use the maths scores as dependent variable in the analysis.4 The maths scale aims to 
measure the ability of students with respect to interpreting and translating problems into a 
mathematical context, using mathematical knowledge to solve problems, and interpreting 
and communicating their results, again based on various tasks. An advantage of the math 
scale is that it is of less cultural but of more cognitive character. The math performance, 
like all other performance measures in PISA, was constructed by applying weighted 
maximum likelihood estimates (Warm 1985) and was translated into scales with a mean 
of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. In addition, the PISA file contains measurement 
error variables for all ability estimations, also for math. We will include this error term 
variable in our analysis to control for the possible measurement error of the math 
performance variable.
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However the math score was not measured for all students in PISA 2000 (contrary 
to the reading score). Only the half of the participating students had also to fill in the 
math test. As a consequence per school we have less pupils as in our reading analysis 
(Dronkers & Robert, 2008). This selection of students filling in the math test was done 
ad-randomly.
Sociological and demographic characteristics of students and parents.
Most of the independent variables used to predict students’ achievement are combined 
indices, developed by PISA. These were also constructed by applying weighted 
maximum likelihood estimates (Warm 1985) and were standardized in such a way as to 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 at the international level of all countries. 
The first set of independent variables involves students’ as well as their parents’ social 
and demographic characteristics. We will differentiate between males and females in the 
analysis. Despite a slight variation, we will control for school grade and age (measured in 
months in the data).5 In keeping with established traditions of social mobility and status 
attainment research, we will include father’s and mother’s occupation and education as 
indicators of social origin. Occupation is measured in the data by the international socio-
economic index (ISEI) (Ganzeboom et al. 1992), while education is measured by the 
ISCED scale (OECD 1999). Further information on family background is number of  
siblings, as well as family structure which distinguishes between nuclear families, single 
parent families and other family constructions. The cultural climate of the family is 
expected to be an important factor of students’ performance. In this regard, the PISA 
survey provides information on how frequently parents discuss political and social issues, 
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books, films, and television-programs with their offspring. PISA has combined these 
individual items into an index labeled Parents’ academic interest. Similarly, students 
were asked to report on how frequently parents discuss school issues with them, eat 
together with them around the table or spend time talking to them at all. PISA combines 
these variables in an index labeled Parents’ social interest. Obviously, students’ personal 
cultural participation is also part of this climate. The survey included questions on 
visiting museums, art galleries, going to the theatre, classical music concerts, or ballet. As 
previous research provides evidence of the effect of high cultural participation on school 
achievement (for example DiMaggio 1982), we included the combined scale score on 
Students’ cultural activities in our analysis. In line with studies on cultural capital 
(Bourdieu 1983), possession-related classical culture contributes to the cultural level of 
the family. The PISA index on Family cultural possession is based on having classical 
literature, books of poetry, works of art at home. In addition to cultural possessions, 
financial capital can also be of importance for educational outcomes. As a direct measure 
of parental income is quite unreliable given that it is the students in the school who report 
on it, a Family wealth index has been constructed based on the presence of dishwasher, 
television, cellular phone, motor car, computer, and a link to the internet at home. Since 
the research aims to explore the predictors of students’ performance, we need to control 
for students’ educational circumstances at home. This is measured by the PISA index 
labeled as Home educational resources, and considers whether or not the student has a 
desk, a quiet place for study at home, and if the family has dictionary, textbooks, and 
calculators. Finally, it probably also matters whether parents work with student on their 
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schoolwork and help them to do their homework. The frequency of these events, as 
reported by the students, is measured by the Family educational support index.
Behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of students and parents. 
The behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of students and parents related to education 
and school is the next set of independent variables. Students were asked to report how 
much time they spend on doing their homework for languages, mathematics and science. 
The index for Time spent on homework is based on these three pieces of information. The 
PISA survey collected information on attitudes towards the school and teacher behavior. 
Students were asked to report on how much interest teachers show in their learning 
progress, how frequently teachers let them to express their own opinion in school or how 
frequently teachers help them to understand school materials. Our Teacher support index 
is based on these items. Further questions were asked about how well students get along 
with teachers, how much teachers are interested in students, how much they listen to what 
students have to say, and how fairly they treat students. PISA combined these questions 
in the Teacher-student relationship index. Students’ performance is affected by the 
general climate in the school and in the class. It matters if the teacher has to wait until 
students sit down quietly at the beginning of the class, if students do not start to work 
when the class begins, if students do not listen to what teacher says, and if there is noise 
or disorder during the class. The School disciplinary climate index is based on students’ 
responses to these questions. Another aspect to be considered is how much the teacher 
wants students to work hard, how much he/she tells them they can work better, how 
much he/she dislikes if students do not work well. Students’ responses to these questions 
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are combined in the Achievement pressure index. An overall indicator of the student-
school relationship emerges from the questions on how much the student feels 
himself/herself as an outsider in the school or feels awkward in the place, how easily 
he/she can make friends there, how much he/she feels liked by the other students, or how 
lonely he/she feels. The PISA index entitled Sense of belonging in the school provides 
combined information on this. 
As part of the behavioral and attitudinal characteristics, the PISA study puts a 
large emphasis on reading habits. A series of items were devoted to students’ attitudes on 
whether or not they like to read, enjoy going to a bookstore or library, feel happy if 
receiving a book as a gift, and if they like talking about books with other people. Or, on 
the contrary, whether he/she feels reading is a waste of time, reads only to get 
information, or finds it hard to finish a book. The Enjoyment of reading index is based on 
the answers given by students. The Reading diversity index summarizes students’ reports 
on how often they read magazines, comics, fiction or non-fiction books, emails and 
newspapers. Finally, two further simple indicators are considered for student performance 
which measure the time in terms of number of minutes spent each week at school reading 
and in maths classes.
School composition.
Since the intention of this analysis is to compare students’ performance in different kind 
of public and private schools, we must control for the social composition of the school 
population in order to avoid biased measuring in evaluating the effectiveness of these 
types of schools. In order to achieve this goal, we compute three aggregated variables 
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from  individual students’ characteristics: the school average of father’s occupational  
status (ISEI), the school average of family’s wealth and the school average of parents’  
academic interest. These three aggregated indices of school compositions cover the three 
most important dimensions of inequality in school composition (financial; occupation; 
cultural). Adding more aggregated indices does not change our results. 
The next indicator of school composition is the proportion of girls in the school. 
Finally a series of variables indicates the place of residence for the student ranging from 
small settlements (inhabitants less than 3000) up to capital city, is included in the 
analysis.
Teaching and learning conditions.
Indicators for the teaching and learning conditions in schools are also considered as 
variables in the analysis of differences in effectiveness. This type of information was 
provided in the PISA survey by school principals. The first indicator of this kind is 
school size, measured by the number of students in the school. Principals were also asked 
to report on the number of teaching weeks per year, the number of class periods per 
week, and the number of teaching minutes per class; the variable Hours of schooling per 
year summarizes this information. There is a widespread belief that availability of high-
tech devices improves students’ achievement in the school. In order to test this 
assumption, we included one measure with respect to high-tech infrastructure from the 
PISA data, namely the Number of computers per student per school, measured as the 
ratio of the total number of computers to the total number of students in the school. The 
availability of “human capital” in the school is another factor which may affect students’ 
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performance. We use one “rough” indicator to measure conditions in the school in this 
respect, and this is the Student – teacher ratio, where the total number of students is 
divided by the total number of teachers in the school. We also include further indices in 
the analysis, based on additional information from school principals on the conditions in 
the school. Thus, the Schools’ instructional resources score is based on the principals’ 
reports on the availability or lack of teaching materials, multi-media resources, science 
laboratory equipment and facilities for fine art education. Furthermore, the Schools’  
material resources index draws on the principals’ reports on physical infrastructure, in 
other words the condition of the school buildings, the quality of the heating, cooling and 
lighting systems, and the availability or lack of space (for example classrooms) in the 
school. In addition, and with respect to human capital resources in the school, principals’ 
views were elicited on the shortage of teachers in general, and in particular in the case of 
languages, mathematics and sciences. This information is summarized in the index of 
Shortage of teachers.
Finally, autonomy also denotes a crucial part of teaching and learning conditions 
in the school, and may have an influence on students’ achievement. The School  
autonomy index is derived from a number of questions to which school principals were 
asked to state whether or not different activities, like hiring / firing teachers, deciding 
about teachers’ salaries and its increases, about the school budget, about students’ 
admission to the school, about choosing textbooks, offering courses, determining the 
content of the courses, are the responsibilities of the school or not. In a next step, 
principals reported on whether or not teachers can take part in the kind of activities 
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mentioned above. These answers served as a basis for the Teacher autonomy index, an 
indicator of teachers’ participation in decision making.
School climate.
School climate represents a final set of school related variables which can influence 
student performance and thus explain differences in effectiveness. The PISA survey 
asked school principals to express their general perceptions of both teacher-related and 
student-related factors affecting the school climate. Teacher related factors include high 
or low expectations of the teachers towards their students, teacher absenteeism, frequency 
of changes in the teaching staff, teachers’ encouragement of students to achieve better, or 
strictness with the students. Student related factors include student absenteeism, 
disruption of or skipping of classes, lack of respect for teachers, use of alcohol or drugs, 
and the intimidation of other students. These indicators are combined into two indices 
labeled Teacher misbehavior and Student misbehavior. Finally, the Teacher morale index 
expresses principals’ perceptions of teachers’ morale, enthusiasm, on how much they 
take pride in the school and how much they value academic achievement. 
Descriptive results
Dependent variable.
We have produced three descriptive tables in order to provide a general view of the basic 
features of the PISA data. Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations our 
dependent variable, the math score as well as for its error term, by type of school. The 
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data shows that the mathematical scores are significantly higher in the two types of 
private schools as compared to the public schools, indicating the higher achievement of 
students in private sector of education. In other words, according to the PISA data, it 
appears that students in private independent schools perform somewhat better. At the 
same time, however, the standard deviation of students’ performance is smaller in private 
schools than in public schools. The measurement error for math seems also slightly 
bigger in public schools with higher standard deviation, as well. 
Private and public schools.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the types of schools in the 19 countries included in the 
analysis, after deleting those schools with less than 11 old pupils with a valid math score. 
On average, more than 80% of the students analyzed here attend public schools, about 
15-16% of them study in private government-dependent schools, while only about 3% 
attend private independent schools.6 A strong deviation from this pattern can be seen in 
Belgium and the Netherlands where only one-fourth of the students attend public schools. 
The equivalent proportion is one-third in Ireland and two-thirds in Spain. In Belgium and 
in the Netherlands about 75% of students attend private government-dependent schools. 
The same proportion in Ireland is about 60%, nearly 30% in Spain, whereas one-fifth of 
students attend such schools in Denmark. The percentage of students in private 
independent schools is the highest (around 8%) in Spain and France.
While there are only a few countries where public secondary schools are much 
less attended, there are several countries where more than 90% of students study in these 
schools instead of in private institutions. The former socialist countries (the Czech 
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Republic, Hungary, Poland), the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Sweden) and Anglo-
Saxon countries (New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the USA) belong to these cases. 
In addition, we also find Germany, Portugal and Switzerland in this group of countries. 
Indeed, the private independent secondary schools seem to be non-existent in the 
educational systems of the Czech Republic, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden), Germany and the Netherlands. Furthermore, this type of private school 
also seems to play a marginal role in secondary schooling in Belgium, Hungary, Poland 
and Portugal. Private government-dependent educational institutions are missing in New 
Zealand, Poland and the United Kingdom (in the latter case due to the deletion of small 
schools). They also seem to play an especially marginal role (around 3% or less of 
students) in Italy, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA.7
Sociological and demographic characteristics of students and parents.
Turning to the independent variables, Table 3a displays means for students’ and parents’ 
characteristics. With respect to gender, significantly less boys study in private 
government-dependent schools. Our data refer to students attending, on average, slightly 
higher grades in the private independent institutions; consequently, they are also 
somewhat older. The classic indicators of social origin - father’s and mother’s occupation 
and education - show that students in public schools come from a significantly lower 
family background. The regular nuclear family background with both parents 
characterizes significantly less students in public schools, with a higher proportion of 
students from these institutions living in mixed families. Also, significantly less students 
live in one-parent families in private government-dependent schools.
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With respect to the cultural capital indicators, students in public schools live in 
families where both cultural and social communication is less frequent compared to the 
family climate of students in private independent schools. The same holds for students’ 
own cultural participation.  In addition, the cultural possession, family wealth and home 
educational resources indices are also the highest for these students. In contrast to public 
schools, both the cultural possession and family educational support indices are 
significantly lower for students in private government-dependent schools.
Behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of student and parents.
Table 3b displays the behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of students and parents 
related to education and schools. The first indicator in this respect shows that students in 
private independent schools spend the most time on homework. Teachers seem to express 
more interest in students in these schools, and the teacher-student relationship index 
scores the highest, which indicates a better match of pupils to the curriculum, pedagogy 
and teachers. The school disciplinary climate, however, is the lowest in these institutions. 
Students in private government-dependent schools report less support from their teachers, 
but also less achievement pressure in comparison to student reports in independent 
private schools. Achievement pressure is also the highest in independent private schools. 
Both measures of reading (enjoyment and diversity) are the highest for the latter 
category, while they are the lowest for students in private government-dependent schools. 
Students in private independent schools spend the most time reading and in maths 
classes.
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Social composition of schools.
Table 3c gives information on the social composition of schools. Girls are significantly 
underrepresented in private independent schools and are significantly overrepresented in 
private government-dependent schools. Public schools have the lowest averages of family 
background characteristics. The school average of father’s social status is the highest for 
private independent schools; the same holds for the school average in family wealth. The 
private government-dependent schools are only slightly better in this respect, in 
comparison to public schools. Interestingly, pupils in private independent schools report 
both the most intensive cultural communication and parental academic interest. This 
index scores the lowest for the private government-dependent schools. In comparison to 
public schools, private independent schools can be found more frequently in larger cities, 
while private government-dependent schools are mostly located in middle-sized 
settlements.
Teaching and learning conditions.
Teaching and learning conditions are presented in Table 3d. In comparison to public 
schools, the school size is significantly larger in private government-dependent schools 
and smaller in private independent schools. The total schooling hours per year is the 
highest in government-dependent private schools, followed by private independent 
schools. The number of students per teacher is significantly higher in private schools in 
comparison to public schools. Despite this quantitative difference, however, the more 
qualitative measure indicates less of a shortage of teachers for languages, mathematics or 
sciences in the private schools, especially in the independent ones. According to the 
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evaluation of the school principals, teaching resources are worse in the private schools, 
especially in the independent ones; the same pattern can also be observed for the material 
resources. The total number of computers per school size is also the lowest in private 
government-dependent institutions. However, the situation is to the contrary when 
autonomy in schools is considered. According to principals’ reports, the degree of school 
autonomy is lower in public institutions; the same also holds for teachers’ participation in 
decision making. It is, of course, possible that the principals of private schools had some 
higher criteria in mind in comparison to the principals of public schools. But it is more 
likely that these differences can be explained by funding differences between public and 
private dependent schools. In some nations private dependent schools are only partly 
funded by their states or not all educational resources are fully subsidized. In some 
nations private dependent school can ask parents for a fee, while in other states this is 
forbidden. The variation in funding differences between public and private dependent 
schools between the studied nations is substantial, but all private dependent schools get 
more than 50 per cent of its core funding from government agencies, while the private 
independent schools get less than 50 per cent of its core funding from government 
agencies. 
 
School climate.
The last set of school-level measures in Table 3e shows further indicators of school 
climate. Principals evaluate the misbehavior of both the teacher and of the students to be 
more frequent in public schools. Teacher morale, on the other hand, is perceived to be 
higher in private schools, especially in the independent ones.
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Controls or explanations?
Some of these characteristics and indicators of schools, like teaching and learning 
conditions or school climate, can also be considered as possible (intermediary) outcomes 
of the differences between public and private schools, and are not only control variables, 
such as students’ and parents’ characteristics or social composition of the school. School 
choice and parental role in these decisions play crucial role in the background of these 
differences. Therefore, we will treat them as intermediary outcomes by adding them in 
special steps into the further analysis, thus separating them from the more demographic 
and sociological variables and the school composition indicator. The reader can decide 
which step in the analysis is the correct one in assessing the differences in effectiveness 
between public and private schools. However, we believe that these intermediary 
variables, important as they are, should not be the final dependent variables of school 
effectiveness analyses. Real acquired knowledge and skills like math performance in our 
case are more appropriate final indicators of school effectiveness, while school climate, 
learning and teaching conditions or behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of parents 
and students are only instruments to reach these final goals of schooling, namely 
knowledge and skills. 
Multi-level analyses
Nested multilevel models.
32
We use multi-level analyses (MlwiN 1.1, Rasbash et al. 2000) with four levels: 1. Test: 
mathematical outcomes as dependent variables and the standard deviations of the error of 
the math score; 2. Students: student and parent characteristics as control variables; 3. 
Schools: government-dependent private schools and private independent schools as two 
dummy variables and public schools as the omitted reference category; other school 
characteristics, including social composition as control variables but also degree of 
freedom of action at the school level as variables to explain effectiveness differences; 4. 
Country: no specific variables.
We start with an empty zero-model with four levels: test, students, schools, and 
countries. At the lowest level we have the weighted likelihood estimates for mathematics 
as the dependent variable and the standard deviation of the error of this estimate. The 
variance at the lowest level is fixed at 1.00. This results in a measurement model of the 
next level of the students (see Hox, 2002). It gives a more reliable estimation of the true 
score of the students because the model takes the measured error into account.
Model 1 is an extension of this empty zero-model: we add two dummy variables 
to the equation at the school level: private government-dependent schools (‘private 
dependent’) and private independent schools (‘private independent’). Public schools act 
as the omitted reference category. The parameters of both dummies indicate to which 
degree students within these two types of schools have higher or lower scores on the 
math tests. 
Model 2 is an extension of model 1: we add all of the sociological and 
demographic characteristics of the students and their parents at the student level to the 
equation. If differences in the math scores between students from private independent, 
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private government-dependent and public schools are caused by the differences in the 
sociological and demographic characteristics of the students and their parents, the 
parameters of the dummies ‘private independent’ and ‘private dependent’ should become 
insignificant.
Model 3 is an extension of model 2: we add the behavioral and attitudinal 
characteristics of students and parents related to education and schools to the equation at 
the student level. If differences in the math scores between students from private 
independent, private government-dependent and public schools remain significant, one 
can conclude that the measured characteristics of the students and their parents are not a 
sufficient explanation of the differences in mathematical performance between students 
from private independent, private government-dependent and public schools. The results 
of model 3 can be interpreted as reliable estimates of the higher effectiveness of both 
forms of private schools, given the characteristics that individual students and their 
parents bring to their private and public schools, or develop while attending these 
schools.
Model 4 is an extension of model 3: we add the social composition of the school-
population at the school level to the equation. If differences in the math scores between 
students from private independent, private government-dependent and public schools are 
caused by differences in the social composition of the school-population, the parameters 
of the dummies ‘private independent’ and ‘private dependent’ should become 
insignificant. The results of model 4 can be interpreted as reliable estimates of the higher 
effectiveness of both forms of private schools, given the compositional school 
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characteristics, resulting from the aggregate choices of the individual students and 
parents.
Model 5 is an extension of model 4: we add the variables which are indicators of 
the teaching and learning conditions in schools to the equation. If differences in the math 
scores between students from private independent, private government-dependent and 
public schools are caused by differences in the teaching and learning conditions in 
schools, the parameters of the dummies ‘private independent’ and ‘private dependent’ 
should become insignificant.
Model 6 is an extension of model 5: we add the variables which are indicators of 
school climate to the equation. If differences in the math scores between students from 
private independent, private government-dependent and public schools are caused by 
differences in school climate, the parameters of the dummies ‘private independent’ and 
‘private dependent’ should become insignificant.
The results of models 5 and 6 can be interpreted as possible explanations of the 
possible higher effectiveness of private schools, given the characteristics individual 
students and their parents bring to their private and public schools or gain by the 
compositional school characteristics, and which result from the aggregate of school 
choices of students and parents. They open partly the ‘black box’ of the likely causes of 
the higher effectiveness of certain schools, which is not related to individual features or 
compositional effects, but can be considered as the ‘real’ added value of schools. 
However, on can maintain that these included teaching and learning conditions and the 
school climate variables of the models 5 and 6 are not fully measuring the characteristics 
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of private schools (for instance their unique pedagogy, other types of school choice). But 
the current PISA data do not contain valid indicators for these characteristics. 
Estimates for these models 0-6 appear in Table 4a.
All these models assume that the parameters of the dummies ‘private 
independent’ and ‘private dependent’ are fixed at the country-level. This means that these 
effects are estimated with the assumption that they do not vary significantly between the 
19 countries. However, if the parameters of the dummies ‘private independent’ and 
‘private dependent’ at the country level happen to be significantly random, then the 
differences in the math scores between students from private independent, private 
government-dependent and public schools are not true for a significant number of 
countries. We test for this possibility of random variance of the slope of the dummies 
‘private independent’ and ‘private dependent’ in all models independently and separately, 
and the results are reported in Table 4b. Finally, Tables 4b gives the relation between the 
slope of the relevant dummy and the level of the intercept of that model, which allows us 
to see whether the variations of the slope of the dummy can be explained by a bottom or a 
ceiling effect. A significant relationship between the slope of the relevant dummy and the 
level of the intercept indicates that slope and intercept are not independent. A positive 
relation suggests a bottom effect: the slope of this school variable is higher if the 
intercept of that school is higher, while a negative relation suggests a ceiling effect: the 
slope of this school variable is higher if the intercept of that school is lower. We test only 
the significance of the slope of the dummies ‘private independent’ and ‘private 
dependent’ at the country level, but not the significance of the variances of the slopes of 
other independent variables, because that is not the topic of this paper. We do not test 
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either the significance of the slope of the dummies ‘private independent’ and ‘private 
dependent’ at the school level, because that would only test whether the effect of these 
schools within countries varies and not whether this effect varies between countries.
Model 0: variances at student, school and country level.
The zero-model shows the amount of variance at the different levels of student, school 
and country. As always, the greatest amount of variance of the dependent variables is at 
the student level (56%), followed by the school level (33%) and the country level (11%). 
However, the variance at all levels is significant and must be explained. The changes in 
the amount of remaining variances at the different levels in the different models illustrate 
that the independent variables do explain a substantial part of these variances. The 
variance at the individual level declines by 22% for the math scores (2905 to 2267). The 
decline of the remaining variance at the school level is even stronger between model 0 
and model 6: it is 70% (from 1717 to 516). However, the change of the remaining 
variance at the country level has an inverted U-form. It increases strongly up to model 2 
(from 556 to 780) and then declines slowly until model 6 to a level above model 0 (680). 
This strong increase of the remaining variance occurs in model 2, where the sociological 
and demographic characteristics of the students and their parents are added to the 
equation at the student level. Such an increase in the remaining variance at a higher level 
is not strange if important variables are included in a multi-level equation at a lower 
level. Nevertheless, such increases indicate that differences in the dependent variables 
have been hidden by differences at a lower level, in this case by the sociological and 
demographic characteristics of the students and their parents. This means that differences 
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between the educational outcomes of the analyzed countries are larger than it seems at 
first sight, but only if one takes the differences in the sociological and demographic 
characteristics of the students and their parents into account. But this is a very important 
observation from the viewpoint of school choice when students and their parents make 
their choice between the options.
Model 1: without any control.
The first model of Tables 4a shows that students in private independent schools and 
private government-dependent schools have higher scores in mathematical tests than 
students at public schools. Furthermore, students in private independent schools have 
higher scores than students on private government-dependent schools. Although reported 
in another form, the coefficients of model 1 are analogous to the results in Table 1. 
However, these differences are not yet a reliable indication of the higher effectiveness of 
private independent and private government-dependent schools because these schools 
also have different students and parents, a different composition of their population. In 
fact, Table 4b shows that these different effects of private independent schools and 
private government-dependent schools do not vary significantly between countries. The 
variances of the slopes are not at least twice as large as their standard errors, and thus the 
variance of the slopes do not significantly deviate from the fixed coefficient at the 
country level.
Models 2 & 3: controlling for students’ and parental characteristics.
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In model 2 and 3 we control the effects of private independent schools and private 
government-dependent schools for the characteristics of students and parents only.
The sociological and demographic characteristics of the students and their parents 
(model 2 in Tables 4a) do not explain fully the higher scores in math performance of the 
students in private independent and private government-dependent schools, but these 
variables explain about half of the original advantages in the  mathematical tests of 
students in private independent schools and private government-dependent schools. 
Therefore, the differences of these characteristics between schools only partly explain the 
higher effectiveness of private independent schools and private government-dependent 
schools. 
We will not discuss the effects of all control variables separately, because they are 
mostly self-evident and because of limitations of space. We will only comment on those 
results which are contra-intuitive or which give more insight into the possible causes of 
the higher effectiveness of private independent schools and private government-
dependent schools. The effect of parental wealth is significantly negative, but this is only 
true because we have strong controls for the social and cultural characteristics of the 
students and their parents. This simply means that high scores in mathematics depends on 
the social and cultural characteristics of students and their parents (especially educational 
level), and that family wealth per se can be more of a hindrance than an advantage, given 
these social and cultural characteristics. The parameter of family educational support is 
negative, which could lead to the strange conclusion that families should not support their 
children educationally. However, family support measures, among others, how often the 
student reports that the parents help the student with their homework. This parental help 
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normally becomes more frequent at the moment when scholastic results are low, and is 
more or less absent so long as the scholastic results are good. This revised causal 
direction can explain the negative parameter.
The behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of students and parents related to 
education and schools (model 3 of tables 4a) do not change the higher scores in the math 
tests of students in private independent and private government-dependent schools, in 
comparison to the scores in model 2 (with only sociological and demographic features of 
the students and their parents as control variables). This does not mean that the 
behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of students and parents related to education and 
schools are unimportant for the prediction of the level of scores in the mathematical tests. 
It only means that they are irrelevant for the explanation of the higher effectiveness of 
private independent and private government-dependent schools.
The negative sign of the coefficient of teacher support can be explained in the 
same way as that of family educational support, that is, by a revised causal direction. An 
increase of help by teachers is often more related to bad scholastic results than to good 
results. The negative signs of the variables related to school disciplinary climate and 
achievement pressure will only surprise those who are not familiar with the didactic 
literature.
The results produced by model 3 can be interpreted as reliable estimates of the 
higher effectiveness of both forms of private schools, given the different characteristics 
that individual students and their parents bring to their private and public schools, or 
develop while attending these schools, after choosing them.
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Model 4: controlling for school composition.
In model 4 we control for the social composition of schools. This is a vital step in the 
assessment of the effects of schools, given that the (self-)selection and allocation 
processes of schools and parents mean that the social composition of schools will differ 
strongly. This different social composition will determine partly the opportunities within 
schools to teach and to learn at a certain level, independently from the individual 
characteristics of students and parents, because it influences the real time spent on 
teaching and the level of non-academic disturbances. The results from model 4 show the 
importance of controlling for social composition of the school in explaining the higher 
scores in the math performance of students in private independent and private 
government-dependent schools. In fact, the higher scores in pupils’ mathematical tests in 
private independent schools can be fully explained by the social composition of these 
schools. In effect, this means that private independent schools are not necessarily more 
effective in their teaching than public schools, but rather that the former schools attract 
on the average more children from the higher classes of society (in terms of occupational 
status, wealth, parental academic interest), which in turn creates a better opportunity 
structure for learning and teaching. The negative sign for private independent schools in 
model 4 even suggests that these schools are less effective than public schools with the 
same social composition – although this negative coefficient is not yet significant (it will 
become significant in model 6).  
The same does not equally hold for private government-dependent schools. The 
strength of the positive coefficient decreases substantially (by more than 50% from 8.8. 
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to 3.0) by controlling for social composition of the schools. Although it remains positive 
but it becomes insignificant.
In model 4 we also control for other compositional characteristics of schools, like 
the percentage of girls and the location of the school. Although these variables have 
significant and interesting effects, they are not responsible for the switch of the sign of 
the coefficient with regard to private independent schools. 
The results from model 4 can therefore be interpreted as reliable estimates of the 
higher effectiveness of both forms of private schools, taking into consideration the 
characteristics of individual students and their parents bring to their private and public 
schools or gain by the compositional school characteristics, and which result from the 
aggregate of school choices of students and parents. 
Models 5 & 6: conditions and school climate as explanations.
In the next two models, 5 and 6, we try to explain why students from private independent 
schools have lower scores for math and students from private government-dependent 
schools have higher (though not significantly higher) scores for math than students at 
public schools.8 The possible explanation of these differences might be the different 
learning and teaching conditions in these schools (school size; number of schooling 
hours; student-teacher ratio; instructional resources; shortage of teachers; school 
autonomy; teacher participation in decision making; material resources – see model 5) 
and the different school climates of these schools (teacher misbehavior; student 
misbehavior; teacher morale – see model 6). 
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Although a number of these conditions affect the test scores, they do not influence 
the strength of the negative effect of private independent schools, when comparing model 
5 to model 4. However, if we add the variables for school climate to the equation in 
model 6, the effect of private independent schools becomes even more negative (and 
significant) than in model 4 or 5. This suggests that private independent schools have a 
better school climate than public schools, but if one take that difference in school climate 
into account they are even less effective than comparable public schools.
Learning and teaching conditions cannot explain the higher effectiveness of the 
private government-dependent schools either. The effect of private government-
dependent schools becomes stronger in model 5 compared to model 4 but remains 
insignificant. This suggests that the learning and teaching conditions in private 
government-dependent school are, on average, less positive than in public schools and 
even if one takes that difference into account they are not significantly more effective 
than comparable public schools. However, the effectiveness of the private government-
dependent schools can partly be explained by their better school climate. As illustrated in 
model 6, when the school climate variables are added to the equation, the effect of private 
government-dependent schools becomes substantially smaller but insignificant (just like 
in model 4 and 5).
Random  variances of slopes.
In Table 4b we can see that the effects of private independent schools and private 
government-dependent schools did not vary significantly between countries in any of the 
models. The variance of the slopes is not at least twice as large as their standard errors, 
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and thus the variance of the slopes does not significantly deviate from the fixed 
coefficient at the country level. This means that these effects are more or less equal for 
the 19 countries we have analyzed.
In the last column of Tables 4b we report no significant variance between the 
slopes of these two dummy variables and the intercepts of the models. This means that 
ceiling or bottom effects cannot explain the coefficients of these variables in the different 
models. This result is important for the interpretation of the lower effectiveness of private 
independent schools, after controlling for students’ and parental characteristics and 
school composition, because it indicates that this lower effectiveness is not a statistical 
artifact, caused by ceiling effects. 
Conclusions
  
Our analysis shows clearly that private government-dependent schools are more effective 
than comparable public schools with the same students, parents and social composition, 
not only for reading (Dronkers & Robert, 2008), but also for math. This is an important 
finding because while reading performance is less dependent of the school effectiveness 
and more of the parental capital. We can now be more sure that the results are not the 
consequence of unmeasured parental cultural capital. The main explanation of this higher 
effectiveness is the better school climate in the former, in comparison to the latter. The 
different learning and teaching conditions in private government-dependent and public 
schools do not explain differences in the effectiveness. This does not mean that private 
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government-dependent schools do not have a more favorable social composition, and that 
this does explain fully the higher educational outcomes of their students. Rather, it only 
means that next to students, parents and social composition, the more favorable school 
climate does provide the full explanation of the higher educational outcomes of students 
from private government-dependent schools, both in comparison with public and with 
private independent schools. 
Contrary to this, our analysis also reveals that private independent schools are less 
effective than public schools with the same students, parents and social composition. 
However, poorer learning and teaching conditions, or a more negative school climate, 
cannot explain this lower effectiveness. The main explanation of their initially higher 
effectiveness is the better social compositions of these schools. This better social 
composition increases the educational outcomes of the students of these private 
independent schools significantly above the level of the other schools, as shown in 
analyses without school composition as a control variable. It might be that this positive 
effect of better social composition reduces the necessity for private independent schools 
to increase their effectiveness further, because even with a lower effectiveness their 
students obtain high levels of educational outcomes thanks to the better social 
composition of these schools. Also, parents who are willing to pay a substantial fee might 
not be so concerned whether it is the social composition or the higher effectiveness of 
these private independent schools, as long as the final scholastic attainment of their child 
is not substantially lower than they may wish. This also gives these private independent 
schools teaching and learning time, which can be devoted to the acquisition of 
qualifications other than the purely scholastic ones like math or reading (for example 
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team-work, competition, leadership, cultural capital). The greater opportunity of private 
independent schools to devote teaching and learning time for the acquisition of team-
work, competition, leadership or cultural capital can compensate for the smaller progress 
in scholastic qualification by private independent school pupils compared to the progress 
of those of public schools.
These effects of private independent and private government-dependent schools 
are more or less equal in the 19 different OECD countries, despite their different names. 
Government-dependent private schools can thus include chartered schools in the USA, 
state granted religious schools in many European societies, but also state granted schools 
with a particular didactic concept like Montessori.9 Government independent private 
schools can thus include religious schools in the USA, religious schools in some 
European societies, but also schools with a particular didactic or philosophical concept 
like Anthroposophy (like the Walddorf schools in Germany). This means that none of 
these countries are exceptional regarding the deviating educational outcomes of their 
private independent or private government-dependent schools, whatever the historical 
background and origin of the non-public schools or their current constitutional 
arrangements (Merrifield, 2007). This also means that the higher effectiveness of the 
private government-dependent sector does not vary with the largeness of this sector. 
Their effectiveness in countries like Belgium and the Netherlands with a large proportion 
of private government-dependent schools is as large as their effectiveness in the US or 
Italy, with a tiny private government-dependent sector. This ‘universal’ effect of private 
independent and private government-dependent schools suggests that these differences in 
effectiveness may be a consequence of modern post-industrial societies, wherein 
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education has become a major dimension of inequality, alongside occupation and wealth. 
In these modern societies school choice and educational ‘markets’ have become 
important means for mobility along the education inequality dimension, indifferent for 
historical and legal nuances and variations.
As said earlier we cannot make the distinction between secular and religious 
private schools, due to an permanent omission in the PISA data of 2003 and 2006, which 
is however an important distinction in school choice debates (Merrifield, 2007). We 
should be able to make this essential distinction, which has proven to be important in 
earlier research in America and Europe. That would allow us to test whether the higher 
net scholastic achievement of private government-dependent schools is related either to 
the religious background of school, teachers and parents or to the private character of the 
schools. Dutch research (Koopman & Dronkers, 1994) on scholastic achievement 
differences between secular private government-dependent schools, catholic or protestant 
government-dependent schools and public schools suggests that students in the former 
schools have lower scholastic results after accounting for student intake and school 
composition. Another important future research question would be whether this higher 
net scholastic achievement of private government-dependent schools is also true for non-
cognitive outcomes, like religious and moral attitudes of the pupils. Dronkers (2004) 
reports that religious schools in Europe were only more effective in cognitive but not in 
affective outcomes. If this outcome was confirmed cross-nationally, it would shed light 
on the increasing popularity of religious schools and school choice in secularized 
societies such as France and the Netherlands, but also in the USA. 
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The multi-level analyses presented here do not allow to separate fully the 
consequences of parental school choice and the consequences of school effectiveness. 
Two different processes can be only distinguished by the different models of the multi-
level analysis, while it remains debatable what is the consequence of school choice and 
what of school effectiveness. In future analyses we need more precise and separate 
analyses of school choice processes in various nations (which might still be very different 
dependent on the constrains and opportunities of the educational local markets) and of the 
effectiveness differences between private dependent and public schools (which might be 
invariant between nations). Student mobility between private and public schools can be 
better incorporate in such separate analyses of school choice and school effectiveness 
processes. 
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Table 1: Dependent variable: Means of the math scores as well as of their error 
terms, by type of schools (standard deviation in parentheses)
School type Private 
independent
Private 
government-
dependent
Public Total
Math score 546.5*
(92.4)
528.0*
(92.7)$
503.8
(96.2)
508.8
(96.2)
Error term of math 
score
42.3*
(13.5)$
41.6*
(13.3)$
43.5
(16.3)
43.1
(15.8)
* Significant differences of mean compared to public schools (t-test with unequal 
variances; p < 0,05); $ significant difference of standard deviation compared to public 
schools (Levene’s test; p < 0,05).
Table 2: Percentages of students and, between parentheses, the absolute number of 
schools by type of school and country
Countries Type of school N of cases
Private 
independent
Private 
government-
dependent
Public
Austria 6.1% (7) 5.7% (7) 88.2% (107) 1985 (121)
Belgium 0.5% (1) 74.7% (138) 24.8% (49) 3352 (188)
Czech Republic - 4.7% (7) 95.3% (144) 2430 (151) 
Denmark - 21.3% (28) 78.7% (102) 1620 (130)
Finland - 2.8% (4) 97.2% (146) 2629 (150)
France 8.0% (11) 14.2% (21) 77.8% (107) 2170 (139)
Germany - 4.9% (7) 95.1% (143) 2068 (150)
Hungary 0.6% (1) 4.4% (6) 95.0% (133) 2488 (140)
Ireland 2.8% (4) 61.8% (77) 35.4% (48) 2001 (129)
Italy 3.4% (5) 0.6% (1) 96.0% (135) 2420 (141)
Netherlands - 76.1% (62) 23.9% (20) 1164 (85)
New Zealand 4.1% (5) - 95.9% (123) 1748 (128)
Poland 1.8% (2) - 98.2% (110) 1796 (112)
Portugal 1.8% (2) 5.5% (7) 92.7% (120) 2254 (129)
Spain 8.4% (13) 29.2% (46) 62.4% (104) 2963 (163)
Sweden - 3.3% (5) 96.7% (136) 2317 (141)
Switzerland 2.9% (5) 1.8% (3) 95.3% (138) 2358 (146)
United Kingdom 5.0% (14) - 95.0% (284) 4151 (298)
USA 3.6% (3) 1.3% (1) 95.1% (83) 1292 (87)
Total 2.7% (73) 15.9% (420) 81.4% (2232) 43607 (2725)
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Table 3a: Independent variables 1.: Means of social characteristics of the students 
and of their parents by type of school (standard deviation in parentheses)
School type Private 
independent
Private government-
dependent
Public Total
Male 0.49
(0.5)
0.47*
(0.5)
0.5
(0.5)
0.49
(0.5)
School grade 9.9*
(0.8)
9.6
(0.6)$
9.6
(0.8)
9.6
(0.8)
Age (in months) 189.0*
(3.5)
188.5
(3.5)
188.5
(3.4)
188.5
(3.4)
Father’s ISEI 54.9*
(17.3)$
45.9*
(16.3)$
43.6
(15.4)
44.3
(15.7)
Mother’s ISEI 50.4*
(15.4)$
43.4*
(14.7)
43.0
(14.5)
43.2
(14.6)
Father’s education 5.0*
(1.2)
4.5*
(1.4)$
4.3
(1.3)
4.4
(1.3)
Mother’s education 4.8*
(1.3)
4.4*
(1.4)$
4.3
(1.3)
4.3
(1.3)
Number of siblings 1.5*
(1.1)$
1.8*
(1.3)
1.8
(1.3)
1.8
(1.3)
Family structure
- Single parent family
- Nuclear family
- Mixed parent family
- Other family type
0.15
(0.35)$
0.78*
(0.41)$
0.05*
(0.21)$
0.02
(0.15)
0.12*
(0.33)$
0.8*
(0.4)$
0.06*
(0.24)$
0.02*
(0.14)$
0.16
(0.37)
0.74
(0.44)
0.07
(0.26)
0.03
(0.16)
0.15
(0.36)
0.75
(0.43)
0.07
(0.25)
0.03
(0.16)
Parental academic interest 0.41*
(0.90)
-0.09*
(1.01)$
0.02
(0.95)
0.01
(0.97)
Parental social interest 0.24*
(0.94)
0.03*
(0.97)$
0.07
(0.98)
0.07
(0.98)
Students cultural activities 0.43*
(1.01)
0.04
(0.96)$
0.04
(.099)
0.05
(.099)
Family cultural possession 0.46*
(0.89)$
-0.12*
(1.00)$
-0.03
(0.99)
-0.03
(0.99)
Family wealth 0.55*
(0.93)
0.03*
(0.82)$
-0.02
(0.95)
0.00
(0.94)
Family educational support 0.01
(0.98)
-0.14*
(0.97)
0.03
(0.98)
0.00
(0.98)
Home educational resources 0.30*
(0.79)$
0.19*
(0.88)$
0.07
(0.94)
0.09
(0.93)
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* Significant differences of mean compared to public schools (t-test with unequal 
variances; p < 0,05); $ significant difference of standard deviation compared to public 
schools (Levene’s test; p < 0,05).
Table 3b: Independent variables 2.: Means of behavioral and attitudinal 
characteristics of students and of their parents by type of school (standard deviation 
in parentheses)
School type Private 
independent
Private 
government-
dependent
Public Total
Time spent on homework 0.26*
(0.93)
0.07*
(0.92)$
-0.01
(0.93)
0.01
(0.93)
Teacher support 0.16*
(1.03)$
-0.11*
(0.96)
0.00
(0.98)
-0.01
(0.98)
Teacher-student relationship 0.26*
(1.02)$
0.01*
(0.91)$
-0.01
(0.97)
0.01
(0.96)
School disciplinary climate -.20*
(1.06)$
0.01*
(1.01)
-0.00
(0.99)
0.00
(1.00)
Achievement pressure 0.08*
(1.05)$
-0.09*
(1.00)$
0.02
(0.98)
0.00
(0.98)
Sense of belonging in the school 0.09
(1.04)$
-0.05*
(0.94)$
0.03
(0.97)
0.02
(0.097)
Enjoyment of reading 0.14*
(1.08)$
-0.08*
(1.01)$
0.00
(1.00)
-0.01
(1.01)
Reading diversity 0.10*
(0.92)$
-0.09*
(1.02)$
-0.02
(0.97)
-0.03
(0.98)
Time in minutes spent reading 
per week
203.0*
(55.6)$
192.2*
(59.1)$
196.0
(82.1)
195.6
(78.3)
Time in minutes spent in maths 
class per week
194.5*
(54.0)$
188.5*
(63.4)$
183.6
(66.7)
184.6
(65.9)
* Significant differences of mean compared to public schools (t-test with unequal 
variances; p < 0,05); $ significant difference of standard deviation compared to public 
schools (Levene’s test; p < 0,05).
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Table 3c: Independent variables 3.: Means of measures for social composition of the 
school population by type of school (standard deviation in parentheses)
School type Private 
independent
Private 
government-
dependent
Public Total
% of girls in the school 47.7*
(28.3)$
51.4*
(26.5)$
49.7
(18.1)
49.9
(20.0)
School average: Father’s ISEI 53.9*
(8.3)$
45.9*
(7.4)$
43.6
(7.0)
44.3
(7.3)
School average: Family wealth 0.55*
(0.48)$
0.03*
(0.40)$
-0.02
(0.57)
0.00
(0.55)
School average: Parental academic 
interest
0.41*
(0.34)$
-0.09*
(0.41)$
0.02
(0.36)
0.01
(0.38)
Location of the school
- capital city
- big city (> 1.000.000)
- city (100.000-1.000.000)
- town (15.000-100.000)
- small town (3.000-15.000)
- village (< 3000)
0.10*
(0.30)$
0.13*
(0.34)$
0.35*
(0.48)$
0.19*
(0.4)$
0.11*
(0.31)$
0.12*
(0.32)$
0.05
(0.23)$
0.02*
(0.14)$
0.21*
(0.40)$
0.42*
(0.49)$
0.21*
(0.41)$
0.09
(0.28)
0.05
(0.21)
0.05
(0.22)
0.17
(0.37)
0.37
(0.48)
0.27
(0.44)
0.09
(0.28)
0.05
(0.22)
0.05
(0.22)
0.18
(0.38)
0.38
(0.48)
0.25
(0.44)
0.09
(0.28)
* Significant differences of mean compared to public schools (t-test with unequal 
variances; p < 0,05); $ significant difference of standard deviation compared to public 
schools (Levene’s test; p < 0,05).
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Table 3d: Independent variables 4.: Means of indicators for teaching and learning 
conditions in the school by type of school (standard deviation in parentheses)
School type Private 
independent
Private 
government-
dependent
Public Total
School size: N of students in 
school
666*
(357)$
712*
(420)$
694
(435)
696
(431)
Total number of schooling hours 
per year
983.9*
(151.1)$
991.1*
(109.1)$
943.4
(138.6)
952.1
(136.0)
Total number of computers per 
school size
0.13
(0.14)$
0.10*
(0.09)$
0.13
(0.13)
0.12
(0.12)
Number of students per teacher 13.4*
(4.5)$
13.3*
(4.3)$
12.8
(4.7)
12.9
(4.6)
Teaching resources -0.73*
(0.87)
-0.24*
(0.96)
-0.08
(0.96)
-0.13
(0.97)
Shortage of teachers -0.69*
(0.65)$
-0.16*
(0.85)$
-0.09
(0.92)
-0.11
(0.90)
School autonomy 0.68*
(0.96)$
0.31*
(0.68)$
-0.02
(0.98)
0.05
(0.95)
Teacher participation in decision 
making
0.25*
(0.72)$
0.19*
(0.88)
0.15
(0.88)
0.16
(0.86)
Material resources -0.66*
(0.75)$
-0.34*
(0.87)$
-0.06
(0.95)
-0.13
(0.95)
* Significant differences of mean compared to public schools (t-test with unequal 
variances; p < 0,05); $ significant difference of standard deviation compared to public 
schools (Levene’s test; p < 0,05).
Table 3e: Independent variables 5.: Means of indicators for school climate by type 
of school (standard deviation in parentheses)
School type Private independent Private government-
dependent
Public Total
Teacher 
misbehavior
-0.84*
(0.96)$
-0.13*
(1.00)$
-0.01
(0.9)
-0.05
(0.93)
Student 
misbehavior
-0.88*
(0.96)$
-0.29*
(1.04)$
0.04
(0.89)
-0.04
(0.93)
Teacher morale 0.39*
(1.03)$
0.06*
(0.89)$
-0.08
(0.95)
-0.05
(0.95)
* Significant differences of mean compared to public schools (t-test with unequal 
variances; p < 0,05); $ significant difference of standard deviation compared to public 
schools (Levene’s test; p < 0,05).
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Table 4a: The fixed coefficients of nested multilevel equations with mathematics 
score as the dependent variable (standard error between parentheses)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 514.1
(5.5)
510.2
(5.3)
302.0
(19.1)
291.2
(18.8)
211.1
(19.4)
212.1
(20.0)
231.0
(20.0)
Private independent 41.1
(5.3)
20.7
(4.1)
20.0
(3.9)
-7.4
(3.7)
-7.1
(3.8)
-9.0
(3.7)
Private government-
dependent
17.5
(3.1)
9.3
(2.4)
8.8
(2.3)
3.0
(2.1)
3.6
(2.1)
1.6
(2.0)
Public Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Students School Grade 33.5
(.7)
32.6
(.7)
31.5
(.7)
31.4
(.7)
31.3
(.7)
Male 14.7
(.7)
18.8
(.7)
19.3
(.7)
19.3
(.7)
19.3
(.7)
Mother’s ISEI*10 3.2
(.3)
3.2
(.3)
3.0
(.2)
3.0
(.2)
3.0
(.2)
Father’s ISEI*10 3.2
(.3)
3.0
(.2)
2.2
(.3)
2.2
(.3)
2.2
(.3)
Age in months -.9
(.1)
-.9
(.1)
-.8
(.1)
-.8
(.1)
-.8
(.9)
Number of siblings -2.1
(.3)
-2.3
(.3)
-2.0
(.3)
-2.0
(.3)
-2.0
(.3)
Father’s education 1.8
(.3)
1.5
(.3)
1.3
(.3)
1.3
(.3)
1.3
(.3)
Mother’s education 2.6
(.3)
2.5
(.3)
2.3
(.3)
2.3
(.3)
2.2
(.3)
Family wealth -.5
(.4)
.5
(.4)
-.3
(.4)
-.3
(.4)
-.3
(.4)
Parental academic interest 5.5
(.4)
3.2
(.4)
2.7
(.4)
2.8
(.4)
2.7
(.4)
Parental social interest -1.2
(.4)
-1.6
(.4)
-1.5
(.4)
-1.5
(.4)
-1.5
(.4_
Students’ cultural activities 4.1
(.4)
1.8
(.4)
1.4
(.4)
1.4
(.4)
1.4
(.4)
Family cultural possessions 3.3
(.4)
1.8
(.4)
1.6
(.4)
1.6
(.4)
1.5
(.4)
Family educational support -11.0
(.4)
-11.1
(.4)
-10.8
(.4)
-10.8
(.4)
-10.8
(.4)
Home educational resources 8.8
(.4)
8.0
(.4)
8.0
(.4)
8.0
(.4)
8.0
(.4)
Nuclear family Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Single parent family -8.6
(.9)
-7.0
(.9)
-7.2
(.9)
-7.2
(.9)
-7.1
(.9)
Mixed parent family -6.1
(1.3)
-5.9
(1.3)
-5.8
(1.3)
-5.8
(1.3)
-5.6
(1.3)
Other family type -21.1
(2.1)
-20.2
(2.1)
-20.3
(2.1)
-20.2
(2.1)
-20.2
(2.1)
Time spent on homework 1.6
(.4)
1.4
(.4)
1.4
(.4)
1.3
(.4)
Teacher support -2.7
(.4)
-2.7
(.4)
-2.7
(.4)
-2.7
(.4)
School disciplinary climate -.4
(.4)
-.4
(.3)
-.4
(.3)
-.3
(.3)
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Achievement pressure -2.3
(.3)
-2.2
(.3)
-2.1
(.3)
-2.2
(.3)
Teacher-student relationship 2.9
(.4)
3.0
(.4)
3.0
(.4)
3.0
(.4)
Sense of belonging in the 
school
.4
(.3)
.3
(.3)
.3
(.3)
.3
(.3)
Enjoyment of reading 8.3
(.4)
8.1
(.4)
8.1
(.4)
8.1
(.4)
Reading diversity 4.9
(.4)
5.0
(.4)
5.0
(.4)
4.9
(.4)
Time in minutes spent in 
maths class per week *100
5.5
(.6)
5.5
(.6)
5.5
(.6)
5.4
(.6)
School average: Father’s 
ISEI
1.7
(.1)
1.7
(.1)
1.4
(.1)
School average: Family 
wealth
14.2
(2.0)
13.9
(2.0)
12.1
(2.0)
School average: Parental 
academic interest
13.7
(2.0)
13.7
(2.0)
12.1
(2.0)
School in Capital city Ref. Ref. Ref.
School in city >1.000.000 -3.3
(3.5)
-4.0
(3.5)
-5.2
(3.4)
School in city 100.000-
1.000.000
5.2
(2.9)
4.9
(2.9)
3.8
(2.8)
School in town 15.000-
100.000
12.5
(2.7)
12.6
(2.7)
10.0
(2.6)
School in small town 3.000-
15.000
15.4
(2.8)
16.3
(2.8)
13.3
(2.8)
School in village < 3.000 17.7
(3.2)
18.7
(3.2)
13.5
(3.1)
% of girls in school 4.6
(3.0)
4.1
(3.0)
.9
(2.9)
School size*100 .5
(.2)
.6
(.2)
Total number of schooling 
hours per year *100
.4
(.4)
.3
(.4)
Total number of computers 
per school size
.1
(4.9)
1.7
(4.8)
Number of students per 
teacher*10
-3.2
(1.6)
-4.5
(1.5)
Instructional resources -1.6
(.7)
-1.0
(.7)
Shortage of teachers -2.5
(.7)
-1.4
(.7)
School autonomy -.3
(.9)
-.4
(.9)
Teacher participation to 
decision making
-.1
(.7)
-.1
(.7)
Material resources .6
(.7)
1.3
(.7)
Teacher misbehavior 3.9
(.8)
Student misbehavior -10.2
(.8)
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Teacher morale 1.4
(.7)
Variance at country level 556
(185)
504
(169)
780
(256)
705
(231)
642
(211)
676
(222)
680
(223)
Variance at school level 1717
(55)
1656
(53)
890
(31)
812
(29)
578
(23)
567
(22)
516
(21)
Variance at student level 2905
(32)
2904
(32)
2375
(28)
2271
(27)
2267
(27)
2267
(27)
2267
(27)
2*log likelihood 502381 502297 495611 494362 493619 493582 493402
Table 4b: The random coefficients and their variances of the private independent 
schools and private government-dependent schools variables at country level (with 
public schools reference), in the different models of mathematical scores (standard 
error between parentheses).
Model -2*log 
likelihood 
coefficient variance slope covariance 
intercept & slope
Private 
independent
1 502292 37.3 (8.3) 409.7 (323.8) -43.7 (188.7)
Private 
independent
2 495607 16.4 (5.2) 130.0 (132.5) -218.4 (155.8)
Private 
independent
3 494358 15.6 (5.3) 145.6 (135.3) -201.2 (148.8)
Private 
independent
4 493615 -11.0 (4.8) 118.3 (107.6) -177.8 (126.6)
Private 
independent
5 493579 -10.8 (4.8) 113.3 (103.9) -194.5 (128.5) 
Private 
independent
6 493398 -12.9 (4.8) 131.2 (107.3) -223.4 (131.5)
Private 
government-
dependent
1 502293 14.7 (4.4) 97.7 (91.7) -10.3 (100.8)
Private 
government-
dependent
2 495609 7.9 (3.2) 48.9 (50.1) 4.4 (91.4) 
Private 
government-
dependent
3 494360 7.4 (3.0) 40.1 (43.7) -8.8 (82.0)
Private 
government-
dependent
4 493616 1.9 (2.9) 41.6 (39.2) -4.2 (72.7)
Private 
government-
dependent
5 493580 2.4 (2.8) 34.3 (35.3) -17.7 (71.5)
Private 
government-
dependent
6 493400 -.1 (2.8) 35.8 (34.9) 51.3 (70.3)
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APPENDIX
Table A1: Means and standard deviations for reading and math scores by type of school 
and countries
Country School type Math score
Mean Standard 
deviation
Austria Private independent 527.5 84.5
Private gov. dependent 534.4 85.3
Public 516.0 89.4
Belgium Private independent 555.8 87.3
Private gov. dependent 540.1 94.5
Public 491.6 105.0
Czech Republic Private independent - -
Private gov. dependent 483.6 77.5
Public 509.2 95.4
Denmark Private independent - -
Private gov. dependent 525.1 90.5
Public 515.0 85.6
Finland Private independent - -
Private gov. dependent 538.7 94.2
Public 533.5 82.5
France Private independent 535.4 82.4
Private gov. dependent 513.0 100.1
Public 511.6 94.2
Germany Private independent - -
Private gov. dependent 552.9 74.2
Public 509.9 95.5
Hungary Private independent 376.4 70.7
Private gov. dependent 504.8 108.0
Public 490.6 94.4
Ireland Private independent 562.4 70.1
Private gov. dependent 509.3 82.4
Public 488.2 88.0
Italy Private independent 480.5 74.4
Private gov. dependent 380.8 97.5
Public 461.2 93.0
Netherlands Private independent - -
Private gov. dependent 570.6 86.3
Public 558.3 98.1
New Zealand Private independent 591.7 85.3
Private gov. dependent - -
Public 535.8 95.7
Poland Private independent 564.9 72.2
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Private gov. dependent - -
Public 466.1 98.2
Portugal Private independent 533.0 78.9
Private gov. dependent 474.3 81.5
Public 464.1 89.7
Spain Private independent 524.1 87.6
Private gov. dependent 496.9 84.4
Public 467.2 93.0
Sweden Private independent - -
Private gov. dependent 505.8 84.6
Public 509.2 94.0
Switzerland Private independent 549.0 85.6
Private gov. dependent 565.3 64.1
Public 535.0 98.1
United Kingdom Private independent 613.5 79.2
Private gov. dependent - -
Public 525.0 89.6
USA Private independent 526.3 88.0
Private gov. dependent 519.5 78.1
Public 486.4 92.6
Notes
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1 The content and structure of this data is summarized as follows on the OECD’s website: “From this page you can 
download the PISA 2000 dataset with the full set of responses from individual students and school principals. These 
files will only be of use to statisticians and professional researchers who would like to undertake their own analysis of 
the PISA 2000 data. The files available on this page include the questionnaires, the data files, the codebooks as well as 
SAS and SPSS control files in order to process the data.”
2 Not only in the PISA 2000 data, but also in the newer data sets (2003; 2006).
3 PISA 2003 focus on mathematical literacy and PISA 2006 on scientific literarcy., while the other scholastic 
achievement were of secondary importance in these waves. 
4 We would like to refer to our other analysis at this point on the same PISA data where the dependent variable is the 
reading score (Dronkers & Robert 2008).
5 In fact, age is taken as a serious explanatory variable for students’ performance even if the grade of the target 
population was defined in a narrow way (15 years old). This is why a very precise measure of age in month is applied in 
the data, and only a three-month testing window was allowed for the data collection in the countries in order to ensure 
the accuracy of students’ age at the time of assessment.
6 Percentages in Table 2 are unweighted. Weighted percentages (when applied the student weight as provided with the 
PISA dataset and described in the documentation) result in slightly different distributions, but the pattern with respect to 
the school types basically does not change. Weighted percentages produce even higher share of students in public 
sphere and the proportion of students in the private, government dependent institutions is smaller. The national 
deviations from the main average display the same picture.
7 As a combination of Table 1 and Table 2, Table A1 (in the Appendix) displays the mean and standard deviation of the 
math scores by type of school and country. It seems that the declining trend in the mean of the math scores from private 
independent schools to public schools, as well as the increasing trend in the standard deviation of the math scores from 
private independent schools to public schools, is present for most of the different nations. Even if there are deviations 
from this trend in certain countries, these deviations do not seem to be related to the variation of the private – public 
sector distribution in the given countries.
8 For reading, students from private government-dependent schools had significantly higher scores than students at 
public schools (Dronkers & Robert 2008).
9 The characterization of USA charters school is made by the PISA authorities, in consultation with the USA data 
collector. This characterization is consistent with that of comparable schools in other European nations. The fact that 
USA charter schools are bound by numerous regulatory requirements by the chartering authorities make them private 
dependent schools, but not yet public. The same holds for comparable schools in Europe, which are also subjected to 
numerous regulatory requirements by their chartering authorities. For instance, private dependent schools in the 
Netherlands, France and Germany are forbidden to charge substantial fees, if they receive substantial state grants.
